Archive for November, 2010

FARC guerrilla #1: Simón Trinidad, FARC Spokesman at the Negotiating Table

Context: Research for Cocaine: An Unauthorised Biography
Location
: Los Pozos, Colombia
Date: November 20th 2000
Interviewee: Simón Trinidad, FARC Spokesman

In this interview, ‘Simón Trinidad‘ (not his real name) discusses FARC’s role in cocaine production – and how the organisation taxes drug producers in its territory. There’s a lot of rhetorical posturing in here – but no matter what your view of FARC is, it’s hard not to agree with a lot of what he is saying. Personally, I liked Trinidad a great deal. He invited me to stay with him so he could give me a tour of FARC territory – specifically some of the cocaine and heroin laboratories in the area. Unfortunately, I had to leave for Peru two days later, so had to decline.

A couple of years later I caught up with him again – again at Los Pozos, just outside San Vincente in Caqueta. He looked a lot older, and more tired. Things were not, apparently, going well for FARC – it was the day before the collapse of the ceasefire. We shared a soft drink while I waited to interview one of his colleagues. Then we shook hands and he left, into the night.

18 months later Trinidad was arrested in Ecuador and extradited to the United States – the first really big FARC extradition case. He is currently serving a 60 year sentence at ADX Florence “Supermax” prison in Colorado.

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This area here is called El Baton. We’ve always been here. This area, 42,000 square kilometres, is now the DMZ. It was requested by FARC’s leaders as an area in which we could conduct negotiations [with the government] and which the rest of the country could have access to. The area we’re in now used to be jungle but the people who moved here cut down all the trees and created these flatlands for their cattle. Because of the war on cocaine in Peru and Bolivia people started planting coca here, in the Amazon, in Caqueta and in Putumayo, further to the south.

What are your numbers here? How many men do you have?

The people who really know about this are the Secretariat but I can tell you that there are 60 guerrilla fronts spread out across 31 Departments of Colombia. The only Departments that don’t have any guerrillas are San Andres Island and Providence.

What is the relationship between cocaine production in Colombia and FARC?

Why did Colombia become a cocaine producing country? Special social conditions. At the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s the Americans essentially taught the farmers to plant marijuana, which was then taken to the US and sold there. The marijuana cultivation then declined because the US began producing marijuana itself. But the organisations here kept their contacts with the traffickers in the US. These criminal organisations then allowed planes full of paste – or cocaine itself – to land in Colombian territory. They would land here, refuel, then head on to the United States. Colombia became the bridge. But because of coca eradication in Peru and Bolivia, people started planting coca here in Colombia. Where there was no electricity, no government presence, it was easy to make clandestine landing strips and then, afterwards, to cultivate coca itself.

Who are the ones who cultivate coca? Campesinos. Why did they come here? They came here because of the government’s abandonment of their traditional crops – maize, yucca, coffee and beans. The government didn’t support them, so they came here. So at the end of the 70s and 80s a lot of people came here to plant coca because it was the only product that they could sell. The drug dealers came to their houses and picked it up. The demand for cocaine made it possible for Colombia to become a coca producing country.

There are intermediaries that buy the paste from the farmers and make it into cocaine and then take it to the US. Those are the drug dealers. Not the farmers. It is one thing to grow coca. It is quite another to make cocaine. Colombia has always grown coca – right back to the time of the pre-Columbian Indians – because they chew it. In the Amazon, in the south-west of Colombia, in the north, there are tribes that use coca and it’s part of their culture. But coca is not cocaine. So who makes the coca into cocaine? A global market, concentrated in the United States, Europe and in Asia. Who is distributing the cocaine in these places? Various organisations – not only Colombians. Italian mafia, Jewish, North Americans and so on. And where is this cocaine distributed? In colleges, universities, bars, discos, socials clubs. Who are the ones who consume it? Youths. Professionals. Yuppies. Sportsmen, artists and politicians. Drug dealing makes over $500 million per year. And the majority of the money circulates in the banks – 90% of which are American.

This business also favours the producers of the chemicals: Americans, Germans, French and English. So this business of coca – from coca to cocaine – the people who benefit most are the foreigners. The campesinos here live in poverty and abandonment. No electricity, no good drinking water, no education, no health benefits. They are not even allowed rights to their own land. And they are persecuted by the state, by the Colombian government. War is declared on them. Is this right?

But FARC is not entirely innocent here, is it? Don’t you tax coca and cocaine production?

We tax the industrialists of Colombia – bankers, businessmen. And in this group fall the drug traffickers. Yes, it’s true. We tax them. We tax the traffickers.

Interview with DEA Agent #3

Context: Research for Cocaine: An Unauthorised Biography
Location
: via telephone
Date: August 26th 2000
Interviewee: Senior DEA Agent

This interview, with a senior DEA agent who will no doubt wish to remain anonymous (if you’re reading this, recognise yourself, and would like me either to name you or to remove the transcript altogether, let me know!), took place in August 2000. The agent was one of the key players in the Agency’s Colombia office for a number of years during the 1980s. He is especially interesting on the relationship between Los Pepes and the Colombian establishment, the rise of the Cali cartel, and on the relationships between drug money and Colombian authorities – from chiefs of police all the way to the presidency

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What drugs were prominent when you started your career in law enforcement? Marijuana?

Yes. We would make a case that led to a seizure of 5lbs of marijuana and we would get excited about it. I was in San Diego. By the time I left San Diego – 1971 – I went to Rome. By that time we had made a couple of cases where ton quantities were involved.

Were other drugs around at the time, too?

Marijuana was obviously the drug of choice but there was also brown heroin and also a little cocaine from South America. Most of the cocaine at that time was coming from Chile.

When did you start noticing cocaine in the US?

Around 1968, 1967. Small quantities, ounce quantities. In all the time I was in San Diego we never made a seizure of a pound of cocaine at that time. It was just ounces.

When did you start picking more up?

Towards the end of the ’70s there was a huge increase. When [Salvador] Allende went down in Chile the government purged the drug traffickers and Chile stopped being a major player in the cocaine business – and that’s when Colombia became a major player. The opportunity was there and Colombia became the cocaine maker of the world. That’s important because that’s when the Cali and Medellin cartels had an opportunity to take over the cocaine world. … [but]  I had never heard of Pablo Escobar until the late 1970s, maybe. Perhaps the beginning of the ’80s.

When was Colombia obviously a problem?

Not long after the Chile thing. By the late 1970s. What happened was we started noticing Colombia. The traffickers in Colombia were smuggling cocaine into the country through couriers and they would bring small amounts of coke with them – a pound, two pounds at a time at the most. Most of them were pickpockets. Suddenly we saw an incredible influx of Colombian pickpockets in the United States, and it was tied into the amount of cocaine that was coming in. We started picking up pickpockets at ports of entry – with cocaine. So it became evident that somehow the cocaine traffic had shifted from Chile to Colombia. Also, there was a time when Chile was prominent that Paraguay was also very prominent. Paraguay was the smuggling capital of Latin America and they got involved. They also played a small role for a while, even when the Colombians were involved – but then they just disappeared.

Why?

Basically I think the Paraguayans were not really narcotics smugglers, they were just smugglers. They knew the routes, they had the infrastructure for smuggling anything. They were smuggling refrigerators – everything. They had the aeroplanes and the routes so they were used as the conduit for a while. But I would imagine that the traffickers in Colombia at one point thought ‘Hey, we can do this ourselves!’ and cut them off the loop. That’s the only explanation I can think of.

And Cubans?

Mostly centred in Miami. But I never worked there myself so I don’t know to what extent.

Do you recall the famous cocaine White Paper during the Carter administration? I’m guessing that led to some degree of disillusion inside DEA?

Yes, we were [disillusioned]. 1976 was a tough year. There were a few years there where we were wondering what was going to happen as far as drugs were concerned. So there was a certain amount of disillusionment. I don’t think we really recovered from this until Reagan…

Interview with DEA Agent #2

Context: Research for Cocaine: An Unauthorised Biography
Location
: Los Angeles
Date: October 4th 2000
Interviewee: Senior DEA Agent

This interview, with a senior DEA agent who will no doubt wish to remain anonymous (if you’re reading this, recognise yourself, and would like me either to name you or to remove the transcript altogether, let me know!), took place in Los Angeles in the summer of 2000. This agent is very interesting on the development of the ‘Kingpin’ strategy that eventually collapsed the Medellin cartel – and the ensuing rise of Cali. He also explains the emergence of some of the main Mexican cocaine cartels – and how ignorance of the ways they were operating in tandem with the Colombians gave them a relatively free hand. The brief section in which he deals with corruption in Mexico is pretty eye-opening.

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There was cocaine in 1965 but very small amounts, mostly from Peru. Mostly by seamen arriving in the New York who were smuggling in a couple of kilos at a time. We didn’t see any large shipments. The biggest I saw back in those days was 5 or 6 kilos at a time. It was a drug used mostly by folks in the entertainment world. Artists, writers, musicians – a cachet drug. It wasn’t highly abused, we didn’t see many ODs or criminal activity other than the smuggling itself. I was in New York City. Half of all the heroin addicts in the US were in the New York area and probably a good portion of the cocaine crowd.

When did the cocaine trade in the US really pick up?

Around 77, 76. When we began to see several things. First of all there was the violence in Florida. We began to see the Colombians and the Cubans shooting it out with each other on the streets in broad daylight, pretty much as they had been doing in their own countries for years. We hadn’t seen that level of violence in the States. Sure, we had a lot of gun violence and drive-bys and that sort of thing but for the most part we have never really had the machine-gunnings and the sort of group-against-group violence that is typical in other parts of the world, particularly in South America. And that was a wake-up call. A lot of the policymakers began looking at this and saying ‘What’s going on?’ and we began to realise that cocaine was flooding the country, that organisations were bringing in 100 kilo shipments at a time and what probably retarded our attention to this somewhat was that heroin had re-emerged, even though the French Connection was out of business for a few years by then and we thought we had made a significant progress on heroin (which we had) our friends in South east Asia began to  produce a lot more than they normally produced and the Mexicans began to ship a lot of better quality heroin into the US and so we were really geared up to go after the heroin when all of a sudden we were hit on our left side – blind-sided – by this flood of cocaine. And as a law enforcement officer, the two drugs present a completely different challenge…

You were a heroin specialist?

Yeah, chasing the French Connection. I was in New York for that interregnum between the demise of the French Connection and the rise of cocaine, when there was almost a sort of a Pax Romana for a couple of years and we actually thought, in the words of Nixon, that we had turned the corner. Well, we turned the corner – to find another corner!

Was there any special incident that drove home to you the new threat?

There were some murders. There was a very interesting case in Queens back in the early 1970s where two young children were found slaughtered in the basement of a family residence in Queens. In a residential area that normally would not see this kind of violence. Even though New York City is a violent place there seems to be some level of violence that it will not stoop to. And that was one that captured the attention of the city for weeks. This incredibly brutal – I think the kids were strangled to death and found hanging from the plumbing pipes in the basement. This was headline stuff for weeks, mostly because the family seemed like it was so normal. It was an immigrant Colombian family that – a man and a woman. I want to say that he was a schoolteacher or something. I know he had a job and they were portrayed as average middle class ordinary people and how could something like this happen to them? All of a sudden about a month or so later it started to come out that this guy was heavily into the cocaine traffic and that he had owed the group some money and he had reneged on paying them and that this was their way of showing revenge. This was sort of an intense symbol that this was something a little bit different.

Even with the heroin trade there was never that degree of violence. If there was a killing it was a mob killing, it was – in their way – justified by their rules. It was not indiscriminate, it was never against a family member. If Lucky Luciano didn’t like Carlo Gambino he wouldn’t kill Carlo Gambino’s wife or mother or child. He would go after Carlo and if he couldn’t get Carlo, he’d leave him alone. This was the way we had been educated to expect the way crime operates and all of a sudden we were visited by this alien variety of brutality and violence. I know it may sound strange coming from a country that has more violence by handguns very year than many others, nonetheless there are some levels and instances of violence that are absolutely out of hand. This was one of them – and it captured the imagination of the people. And then when the public found out that this was drug-related, it ushered in a whole new era of thinking about this drug… All of a sudden we realised that there was this growing criminal culture behind [cocaine] that was alien in both the literal and figurative sense.

Interview with Hugo Martinez – the man who ‘got’ Pablo Escobar

Context: Research for Cocaine: An Unauthorised Biography
Location
: cafe in Bogota, Colombia
Date: November 2000
Interviewee: General Hugo Martinez

This interview is with Hugo Martinez – the man who ‘got’ Pablo Escobar. General Martinez explains the rise – and rise – of cocaine trafficking in Colombia, and how he came to be in charge of the operation to kill the richest, most violent, criminal in history. This interview took place in a cafe in Bogota in November 2000.

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Was there any cocaine around in Colombia when you started your career in 1964?

No. At that time marijuana was the only drug here – and even then not too many people were using it.

When did you start noticing cocaine?

We started arresting users in around 1971, 1972. But back then a big bust was like half a kilo, a kilo.

Was it dangerous working in drug interdiction back then?

It was dangerous because the people who were working in the drug trade were already delinquents, they were already criminals.

Was it the marijuana traffickers who became the cocaine traffickers, or outsiders?

It was other groups – at least in my area. According to police information we had at the time, marijuana trade was largely located in the Guajira, Sierra Nevada Mountains.

Where did cocaine come from at first?

It started when they brought it in from Peru. That’s where the trafficking started. Peru. It was sold in public in small quantities, like marijuana at first.

When did you begin to notice the increase in power and money behind cocaine trafficking?

In 1971 and 72 the police formed a special anti-drug unit in the Department of Judicial Police. It was especially to tackle cocaine because the US police was already asking Colombian authorities to co-operate. One or two of us were captains who were interested in learning more about cocaine. Sometimes we would find laboratories but only small ones. We would check them out, investigate, and try to find out who was behind them. Medellin had always had a big crime problem, and a bit further south in the State of Caldas, in the coffee areas. And the northern part of Valle Department (Where Cali is). Basically it was the coffee areas. Those were the areas for contrabanding. All types of stuff was coming in from Panama… At that time it was a relatively minor thing.

The first big traffickers and dealers? Santiago Ocampo, Griselda Blanco and the others?

Griselda Blanco! The queen of cocaine! 1973, 1974. That’s when you started to see the traffickers becoming visible for the first time. Most of them are dead now. A few are still alive…

At what point did the violence start?

At the time I was in charge of F2, the sort of secret police, every time there was a big robbery or a killing or a kidnap by then it was always related to drugs. And the majority of the people we were arresting came from Medellin.

It was always a violent trade?

Always violent. We were already seeing a lot of people killed by sicarios. All of these deaths were related to the upcoming of the new heads of the cocaine trade.

Why was this based in Medellin?

Medellin and Cali were the coffee areas. They were always involved in contraband trade. We were also detecting the trade in Bogota, Barranquilla and other cities – but the majority was around the coffee growing areas.

Was there a moment of realisation – when you thought ‘this could be really, really bad’?

Yes. It started with the corruption, especially in the northern departments up by the coast. The army was sent in to fight drugs but the corruption was so bad that you had generals in jail! At that time, 74 and 75, 76, …there was the Coffee Bonanza. The coffee price just shot up. So the traffickers started moving coffee outside of Colombia. So we started trying to control the coffee trade.

Interview with Dr David Owen

Context: Research for Brainwash: The Secret History of Mind Control
Location
: Via telephone
Date: 2005
Interviewee: Dr David Owen (now Lord David Owen)

This interview, with Dr David (now Lord) Owen shows a far more caring side to William Sargant – and hopefully puts paid to some of the more ‘out-there’ rumours about him and his treatments (‘he wasn’t a Doctor Sinister, you know’). Is it possible for both Sargant-haters and the Sargant-lovers to be correct? Actually, I think it probably is.

Download: Download Interview (PDF)

The fact is [William Sargant] was an extremely controversial figure. He was not averse to – he was such a dominant personality that he, I mean he wouldn’t ask a patient: he would say ‘You’re better, aren’t you?’ And they would say ‘Yes, Doctor Sargant.’ And then he would put a tick. And then that particular ECT or whatever it was, was successful. A normal scientist would say ‘How are you feeling today?’ and they would say something and he would make a judgement about whether or not they were better. But Sargant would say ‘You’re better today, aren’t you!’ (laughs)

That meant that his terms as a researcher – he was not really always the best of, of the highest standard as an objective researcher. That, I think, is a valid criticism of him.

Did he think he was a researcher at all?

Well, he wrote many, many papers. He was a prolific publisher and he used every form of technique to get his view of psychiatry across. Like, you would sit in the consulting room with him and the doorknob would turn, and Sargant would say ‘He’s better!’ And I’d say ‘He hasn’t even walked through the door yet!’ And he’d say ‘Ah – but did you see the way he turned the doorknob? He’s better! That would have been very slow a week or a fortnight ago.’

This is the downside about him. What he was, was an optimist. It was said that he had a very serious depression when he was a registrar at St Mary’s. I think that the advantage of that is that he did understand what it was like to be depressed, and a lot of psychiatrists don’t understand it…

For me [working alongside William Sargant] was particularly interesting because I might well have ended up doing psychiatry. [Sargant] was very difficult to be – most people were either positive or negative about him. They aren’t in-between about Will. I consider that he was, for all his flaws and faults – and they were quite considerable ones – a great man. And I think one of the keys to his greatness, was that he understood.

As neurologists we used to deal with terrible pains and he used to say to us, ‘How often have you seen somebody commit suicide because of pain?’ Answer: practically never. Occasionally but very, very rare. ‘How many times have you seen somebody commit suicide on depression?’ Frequently. Ipso facto, according to Sargant, that explains why depression is such a bloody awful illness. ‘That is what people forget, what they don’t understand. This is a terrible, terrible thing. Absolutely demoralising, you just can’t live with it.’ Therefore, he would say, ‘OK, I take risks! In order to relieve them of the depression. I double the dose of the antidepressants, or I run the risk of slight liver thing’ (the drugs then were in those days questioned as to whether they had some adverse effects, especially on the liver.) … Some would say that that was a reason for dropping the drugs. For Sargant it was not at all. He would weigh up the effect of that with the depth of their depression. And if he thought their depression was very serious he would carry on with the drugs. Or double the drugs. And he would be quite open about it. He’d say ‘I think you have to assess this question of side effects vis-à-vis how ill and depressed they are. This is not just a question of making a judgement, “this drug has a side effect therefore I can’t use it”: if this drug has an effect that can help this person, then they should do so.’

So he was a therapeutic optimist, not necessarily a rationalist, and I think this did lead him to making some claims for the treatments. He over-claimed. And then his style in dealing with the analysts who didn’t believe you should have any physical methods… –  he would, run a sort of vendetta, I’m not sure if that’s the right word – a vitriolic denigration of the analysts, whereas most psychiatrists who support methods of physical treatment would still say, ‘Well, there’s a role for psychiatry and maybe even analysis.’ But this led to him being absolutely hated by anyone who thought psychotherapy had any meaning and value in psychiatry. He polarised opinion and probably did a little harm to physical methods of treatment by this record of over-claiming, this therapeutic optimism, and then this sort of bravado. But great men don’t come packaged neatly, do they? … And he IS the father of physical methods of treatment! …

He never brainwashed me! I remained catholic with a small ‘c’ on the treatments.

Did Sargant ever mention his work with the military, or intelligence agencies, to you?

No. I didn’t know him well enough to know that. And I never really kept up with him once I had become a politician. There were some aspects of him which I found – not my bag, really.