Posts Tagged ‘Brainwash: The Secret History of Mind Control’

Test your subliminal smut quotient: can you see the hidden porn in these famous images?

To celebrate the fact that spring seems to be here at last – and the fact that I’ve finally managed to transcribe the interview with Wilson Bryan Key – the world’s pre-eminent expert on the use of subliminal coercion – here’s a brief test.

Following are eight famous images, all of which have been argued – by Key, and others – to contain subliminal images. Click on each image to enlarge it, then take a long, hard and see what filth leaps out at you. What is really going on? Answers are below each image.

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Brainwash: mind control source interviews

For those interested in this kind of thing, new interviews are available in the ‘Source Material’ section of the site. These include:

Monsignor Denis Faul - Northern Irish human rights campaigner on Internment, the British Army’s use of ‘interrogation in depth’ in 1971 and how the IRA purloined secret interrogation techniques in the immediate aftermath of the incident, including the use of white noise, wall standing and hooding.
Reverend Sam Davies - the only British military padre taken prisoner in Korea on Chinese brainwashing techniques and conditions inside the camps.
Dr Ronald Sandison - the first British doctor to use LSD – on the drug, his discovery of it, how he gave it to psychotic patients in Wales in the 1950s and his relationships with Timothy Leary, Albert Hoffman and Aldous Huxley.
Wilson Bryan Key - the godfather of subliminal conspiracy theorists on how US advertising agencies insert smut into merchandising campaigns for household products, his purported role with US Special Forces in Panama (!) and the Judas Priest subliminal trial.
Examples of Key’s work and theories will follow shortly.

Interview with Dr David Owen

Context: Research for Brainwash: The Secret History of Mind Control
Location
: Via telephone
Date: 2005
Interviewee: Dr David Owen (now Lord David Owen)

This interview, with Dr David (now Lord) Owen shows a far more caring side to William Sargant – and hopefully puts paid to some of the more ‘out-there’ rumours about him and his treatments (‘he wasn’t a Doctor Sinister, you know’). Is it possible for both Sargant-haters and the Sargant-lovers to be correct? Actually, I think it probably is.

Download: Download Interview (PDF)

The fact is [William Sargant] was an extremely controversial figure. He was not averse to – he was such a dominant personality that he, I mean he wouldn’t ask a patient: he would say ‘You’re better, aren’t you?’ And they would say ‘Yes, Doctor Sargant.’ And then he would put a tick. And then that particular ECT or whatever it was, was successful. A normal scientist would say ‘How are you feeling today?’ and they would say something and he would make a judgement about whether or not they were better. But Sargant would say ‘You’re better today, aren’t you!’ (laughs)

That meant that his terms as a researcher – he was not really always the best of, of the highest standard as an objective researcher. That, I think, is a valid criticism of him.

Did he think he was a researcher at all?

Well, he wrote many, many papers. He was a prolific publisher and he used every form of technique to get his view of psychiatry across. Like, you would sit in the consulting room with him and the doorknob would turn, and Sargant would say ‘He’s better!’ And I’d say ‘He hasn’t even walked through the door yet!’ And he’d say ‘Ah – but did you see the way he turned the doorknob? He’s better! That would have been very slow a week or a fortnight ago.’

This is the downside about him. What he was, was an optimist. It was said that he had a very serious depression when he was a registrar at St Mary’s. I think that the advantage of that is that he did understand what it was like to be depressed, and a lot of psychiatrists don’t understand it…

For me [working alongside William Sargant] was particularly interesting because I might well have ended up doing psychiatry. [Sargant] was very difficult to be – most people were either positive or negative about him. They aren’t in-between about Will. I consider that he was, for all his flaws and faults – and they were quite considerable ones – a great man. And I think one of the keys to his greatness, was that he understood.

As neurologists we used to deal with terrible pains and he used to say to us, ‘How often have you seen somebody commit suicide because of pain?’ Answer: practically never. Occasionally but very, very rare. ‘How many times have you seen somebody commit suicide on depression?’ Frequently. Ipso facto, according to Sargant, that explains why depression is such a bloody awful illness. ‘That is what people forget, what they don’t understand. This is a terrible, terrible thing. Absolutely demoralising, you just can’t live with it.’ Therefore, he would say, ‘OK, I take risks! In order to relieve them of the depression. I double the dose of the antidepressants, or I run the risk of slight liver thing’ (the drugs then were in those days questioned as to whether they had some adverse effects, especially on the liver.) … Some would say that that was a reason for dropping the drugs. For Sargant it was not at all. He would weigh up the effect of that with the depth of their depression. And if he thought their depression was very serious he would carry on with the drugs. Or double the drugs. And he would be quite open about it. He’d say ‘I think you have to assess this question of side effects vis-à-vis how ill and depressed they are. This is not just a question of making a judgement, “this drug has a side effect therefore I can’t use it”: if this drug has an effect that can help this person, then they should do so.’

So he was a therapeutic optimist, not necessarily a rationalist, and I think this did lead him to making some claims for the treatments. He over-claimed. And then his style in dealing with the analysts who didn’t believe you should have any physical methods… –  he would, run a sort of vendetta, I’m not sure if that’s the right word – a vitriolic denigration of the analysts, whereas most psychiatrists who support methods of physical treatment would still say, ‘Well, there’s a role for psychiatry and maybe even analysis.’ But this led to him being absolutely hated by anyone who thought psychotherapy had any meaning and value in psychiatry. He polarised opinion and probably did a little harm to physical methods of treatment by this record of over-claiming, this therapeutic optimism, and then this sort of bravado. But great men don’t come packaged neatly, do they? … And he IS the father of physical methods of treatment! …

He never brainwashed me! I remained catholic with a small ‘c’ on the treatments.

Did Sargant ever mention his work with the military, or intelligence agencies, to you?

No. I didn’t know him well enough to know that. And I never really kept up with him once I had become a politician. There were some aspects of him which I found – not my bag, really.

More Source Interviews

Had some time to dig up more stuff. Now accessible are interviews with a handful of British and American interrogators and some of the interviews that took place for Brainwash – especially on the issue of William Sargant and ‘modified narcosis’ as practised in Ward 5 of the Royal Waterloo Hospital. I’ll be adding more shortly.

Interview with Senior Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officer on interrogation

Context: Research for Brainwash: The Secret History of Mind Control
Location: Via telephone
Date: 2005
Interviewee: Senior RUC Officer on Interrogation

This brief interview is interesting partly because the officer concerned admits that the Five Techniques were used in Northern Ireland (and adds a new one – pushing suspects out of airborne helicopters as a form of mock execution) and partly because he notes the effect of the withdrawal of those techniques after the 1971 incident was made public: to IRA suspects, Castlereagh became a place ‘without teeth’, As a result, the intelligence take dropped substantially.

He also discusses the techniques terrorist suspects used to stop themselves breaking under interrogation – and tells an extraordinary story about how the simplest of items can be made to force a suspect into a confession – in this case, a pair of Marigold household rubber gloves. Interrogators I have spoken to since this interview invariably laugh when they hear this story – then disagree about whether the technique would be acceptable today.

Download: Download Interview (PDF)

Our techniques of interrogation which we used in the early – the start of the conflict here [in Northern Ireland] – we used the army techniques of sleep deprivation, white noise and the hooding thing that is now very much in vogue in Iraq. It’s funny, the way those things come back around. Those techniques we used here in Internment in 1971 as a way of disorientating a person to make them talk. [It was] just a pressurised interrogation.

Hooding, white noise and wall-standing were used systematically at that point?

After the troops came onto the streets of Derry, the military took primacy over the police. We really had no interrogation: we were just police – well a paramilitary police, an armed police. That’s the only difference and we had a land border to secure, we had big border guards down as well, stationed on the border because of the conflict with the 26 counties. And we had no background at all, and that’s why Internment was so badly handled. We nearly arrested anybody who played for a Gaelic football team! So the military had to teach us how to do interrogation. We did questioning and generally crime was quite low in Northern Ireland and everybody usually did it and there wasn’t much of a chance of interrogation.

So on interrogation and when they were taken to Palace Barracks in Holywood, I think everybody got a claim out of it and it went to the European Court of Human Rights. There certainly was white noise used, there certainly was hoods used, there certainly was standing for a long time. And sometimes we carried those things through to interrogations in Castlereagh. More the standing with your hands against the wall for long, long periods.

But the terrorists soon became very, very good at countering it. We would, at the time, the guys that you were interrogating would not speak if you had them for 7 days. They just would not speak.

Even with no sleep?

No, what came in after the European Convention of Human rights – the whole system was let down quite clearly, and it’s why instead of using interrogation to break the terrorists we started to use intelligence. What happened was the well from the Castlereagh and the holding centres dried up in that you couldn’t use Sleep Deprivation, you could not question between midnight and 8am in the morning unless it was under very specific circumstances – like the ticking bomb scenario. But you couldn’t do it otherwise. There had to be regular meal breaks, they asked to go to the toilet, they had to be allowed to go and there was a form came in for that, and that actually was a forerunner to PACE which came in across the UK.

I’m not saying that some of them didn’t get the odd thump at Castlereagh or the odd slapping, but there wasn’t the systematic beating which they would make you think there was. And there wasn’t the horror stories that came out. … They’d come in, think they were going to be tortured, think there were going to be electrodes attached to their testicles, thinking there were going to be people coming with rubber hoses to beat them up. And all the rough handling at Castlereagh, all the sensory deprivation, and all the naked [stuff], standing – the European Court of Human rights, when they said it was a breach of their human rights, it was all altered in 76, 77, 78. That’s why we moved towards the intelligence-led policing model. We had to because interrogations were not getting the results.

I remember with ****** [a famous IRA suspect] one time, I said ‘Look, we’ll get this sorted out. I don’t want to arrest you and have you taken to Castlereagh’. And he said ‘Castlereagh holds no tigers for me.’ Because all the teeth that Castlereagh had had been systematically pulled. And you know, this is – the Americans seem to have made all the exact same mistakes that the British government made in the early ’70s. They have now made in Guantanamo Bay and these other prisons. Their interrogation: most of the people they’re interrogating are internees, the same as the internees we were interrogating. Then we turned it on because whenever a person was taken to Holywood Palace Barracks, that’s where the holding centre was in internment in 1971. I was only a part time reserve constable then, I was not a full-time member of the police service but from the stories that you hear, and from people who were involved in it, white noise was used. Hooding was used. Long standing was used.

And there was another technique. They used to put them into helicopters and then took them up high. Then they pushed them out when they were only two or three feet above the ground. You know, they disoriented them. They were hooded. They were in a helicopter. The helicopter took off, then bounced about and came down to a couple of feet again, you know, so that the people were so disoriented that they didn’t know where they were. Then they threw them out as if they were throwing them out from a height.

Were these techniques that had come from the British army?

Oh aye. That was a standard military interrogation technique then. It wasn’t – that was the use at the time. And I would say during the second world war, they didn’t have helicopters, but where that developed, whether that developed during the Cold War period, but there were certainly interrogation techniques built up and grew. And sleep deprivation and white noise and disorientation and all those things that confuse a person certainly – it was taught. That’s what the army taught the police.